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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STA'fE OF UTAH
ELIZA Rl' f~ WOOD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.THEO N. WOOD and
RUTH L. WOOD,
Defendants atnd Respondents.

Case
No. 8886

APP·ELLANT''S BRIEF
STATEJ!fEN1, OF FACTS
The judgment appealed from was entered at the
conclusion of a jury trial of an action involYing charges
of negligence and countercharges of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, wherein the Court
instructed the jury to return the verdict of no cause of
action in fav0r of defendants and against plaintiff (R.
1-3, 104A, 105).
Defendants are son and daughter-in-law, respectively, of plaintiff and occupy a residence at 6268 South
9th East in Salt Lake County, Utah, which residence was
the scene of the accident of which the plaintiff complains (R. 11, 14).
1
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On the day of the accident, October 15, 1956, plaintiff telephoned defendant Ruth L. Wood (hereinafter
referred to as "Ruth") to confer with her about making
arrangements for the wedding of plaintiff's granddaughter, the offspring of plaintiff's second daughter. The
wedding was to occur on October 26, 1956, some eleven
days subsequent to the time the accident occurred (R.
1.2). Ruth had previously offered to address invitations
and to make one of the bridesmaid's dresses, and during
the telephone conversation advised plaintiff that these
were ready for plaintiff to call for at defendant's home,
whereupon plaintiff told Ruth that she (plaintiff) would
come out to the defendants' home that evening. Ruth
then said, ''If there are no lights in the front of the
house we'll be in the back room watching television"
(R. 12).
Plaintiff was driven by her husband to the residence
of the defendants on the evening of October 15, 1956.
\Vhen they arrived it was nighttime. The plaintiff and
her husband drove up the defendants' driveway, stopping a few feet in front of the partition that separates
the two garage door·wa~-s of the defendants' double
garage. The ga ra~e door nearest the living quarters of
defendants, i. P. the door to the east, was open (R. 45,
line 19 to H. -Hi, line 1; R. 73, lines 1 through 4). ~-\. car
'Yas parked in the east half of the garage next to the
living quarters (H. 72, lines 9-18 and exhibit 2-P). Only
the rear part, i. t'. the den of the home was lighted (R. 46,
lines 9 and 10). Earlier in the day the defendant Ruth
Wood said, "If there are no lig-hts in the front of the
2
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house, we will be in the back room (den)." ( R. 12, lines
19 through 21)
rrhe plaintiff's husband turned off the automobile
lights, the plaintiff proceeded out the right door of the
car and the plaintiff's husband out the left (R. 46, line
28 through R. 47, line 6). At this point of time (and before) the plaintiff saw emanating from the right-hand
side of the garage rays of light of low intensity, which
she surmised and which in fact came from cracks surrounding the closed door of the ''den'' or rear part of
the residence (R. 17, lines 13 through 16). However, the
garage itself was almost totally dark (R. 40, lines 9
through 11). The rest of the house was also dark as it
was outside the house, since it was nighttime (R. 12, 17,
46, 47 and 14, lines 18 and 19).
There is to consider the plaintiff's knowledge and
situation immediately prior to her entrance into the defendants' garage and fall into their stairwell. The plaintiff had visited the premises twice before, once when the
home was under construction (when the stairwell did
not exist) and once when she and her husband had visited the premises in 1955 (probably in December) some
ten months prior to the accident. (See R. 50, line 29 to
R. 51, line 12 ; R. 17, line 22 through R. 18, line 1 ; R. 36,
lines 5 through 8; R. 75, lines 17 through 19.) At the
time of the December visit, plaintiff did not enter
through the garage entrance, but rather entered the front
door, was shown the interior of the house and then was
conducted from the den, through the den door, and to the
3
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left down the stairwell in the garage. (See R. 17, line
24 through R. 18, line 10 and exhibit 4-P.) This tour was
made by flashlight and a fair inference follows that the
lights installed in the garage were off. In fact, there is
no evidence that at that time or any other time prior to
her accident she acquired knowledge that the garage in
fact had lights. (See R. 17, lines 24 through 30.)

It is true that the plaintiff had some "knowledge,"
prior to her entrance into the garage that a stairwell
existed in the garage, and on the side nearest the living
quarters but she did not know the approximate location
of the stairwell, the fact that the cement was elevated
around it, nor how far out the stairwell extended into the
garage. Further, she did not know and had no way of
ascertaining the distance between the stairwell and the
ear parked in the garage around which she was to pass
(and in doing so, fall into the stairwell). (R. 36, and 37,
lines 1 through 18; R. 16, lines 27 through 30; exhibit
2-P.) Furthermore, on the sole previous occasion of seeing the stairwell under flashlight illumination (ten
months prior to the accident) the plaintiff was assured
by Ruth at that time that a protertiYe iron railing was
going to be installed around the dangerous stairwell.
To rite the record at pages 75 and 76:
(HliTH)

ing down

,\.

\Ye talkl'(! ahout it

H~

we were walk-

stair~.

( l\lu. 1 1~\·Ax~) Q. And what did vou saY about it
pl en se ? Xow, this i ~ 011 the orrasi.on of Derember
of 19:>5, is that rig-ht!
:\.

rrlwr0a bouts.
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Q. All right. Now, what did you say to Mrs.
Wood about the stairway on that occasion f

A. I can't remember. I couldn't remember that.
The fact that we had put the stairway there was
discussed.
Q. And you discussed the fact that you at one
time planned on putting it down from the kitchen
down into the basement f
A. That is right.
Q. And that you changed your plans and you had
put it down into the garage 1
A. That is right.
Q. And did you discuss with her that you were
going to put up a railing or a wall to separate
that stairway from the garage 1
A. Yes.
Q. And so you told Eliza Rue Wood when she was
on this inspection of your house that you had
planned on putting up an iron railing or a wall to
separate the garage from the stairwell, is that
right~

A. Yes.
Q. And had you ever thereafter told her that that
iron railing or wall had not been put up 1
A. I can't recall whether it was mentioned or not.
The promised protective railing was never installed
(Exhibit 2-P). Plaintiff neither knew nor ·was advised
that in fact the railing had not been installed (R. 36, 76).
Further, she was given no warning about coming in
through the garage on the night in question (R. 18, 19).
Additionally, there was testimony that, owing to emotional upset and concern over the wedding, plaintiff had
5
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temporarily forgotten about the stairwell immediately
prior to her fall (R. 78).

It should be mentioned at this juncture that alternate routes were available to the plaintiff to seek entrance
into the den of the home. These consisted of the walkway
leading to the front entrance and a walkway around the
garage to the back of the house. However, both walkways
were also unlighted-dark (R. 39, 40).
At the pre-trial before another judge of the District
Court of Salt Lake County, both parties made motions
for summary judgments in their favor, based upon plaintiff's and defendants' depositions. The Court ordered
the depositions to be opened and published for the purpose of entertaining the motions, and subsequently
denied both motions (R. 4-8). The plaintiff's deposition
and her testimony at trial are very substantially the same.
At the close of the testimony at trial, the Trial Court
received and granted defendants' motion for a directed
verdict, on the specific and sole basis that the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
(See the record at p. 101, line 24 through p. 102, line 25.)
Judgment was entered on the verdict. Thereupon,
plaintiff made a motion for a new trial. The Trial Court
denied the motion and instead affirmed its direction of
verdiet, basing the affirmation upon the ''evidence taken
at trial and the argument of counsel, and upon the rules
announced in the case of Tempr'st v. Rirhardson, 5 Utah
2d 174 (299 P. 2d 1~4), and the cases therein cited."
(R. 107)

6
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STATEMEXT OF, POINT RELIED UPON
POINT

I.

TI!E TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING
THE .JURY TO RETURN A VERDICT IN
FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS (RESPON"DENTS)
AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF (APPELLANT) OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION, AND IN
ENTERING JUDGMENT THEREON.
ARG lT l\IENT
PorNT

I.

r:rHE rrRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING
THE JURY ':1_10 RETURN A VERDICT IN
FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS (RESPONDENTS)
AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF (APPELLANT) OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION, AND IN
ENTERING JUDGMENT THEREON.
The alleged error of which the plaintiff complains
consists in the granting by the Trial Court of the defendants' motion for a directed verdict in their favor on
the ground that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
Thus, the ultimate issue presented by the plaintiff's
appeal is whether or not, from the evidence contained in
the record, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The law is clear as to when a court may properly
take a case from the jury and grant a motion for a directed verdict on the basis of the plaintiff being guilty
7
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of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In Stickle
v. Union Pacific R. Co. 251 P. 2d 867, 122 Utah 477, Supreme Court of "Utah, December 23, 1952, the Court states
the following at the bottom of page 870 in the left-hand
column:
'' ... tl1e question of contributory negligence is for
the jur~· whenever the evidence is such that jurors,
acting fairly and reasonably, may say that they
are not eonvinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence
which proximately contributed to cause his own
injury.

"It should be kept in mind that so far as the
quantum of proof necessary to take the question
of contributory negligence from the jury is concerned, the tests are the same as with respect to
primary negligence. For instance, in a given case,
there may be some evidence upon which a finding
of negligence by the defendant could be based, yet
the jury may remain in such a state of mind that
they may fairly say that they are not convinced by
preponderance of evidence that the defendant was
negligent, and based upon such failure of proof
may refuse to find a verdict against him. It would
only be when the defendant's negligence had been
established with such certaint~- that all reasonable
men must conclude that he did not exercise reasonable rare, that the court would rule as a matter
of law that he was negligent and direct the jury to
find a verdict against him; conYersely, if evidence
were such that reasonable men may fairl~- say that
they nre not convinced from a preponderance of
tlw <.\vidence that was guilty of negligence, the
court could not rule that was negligent as a matter
of law and take the case from the jury.''
8
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It should be noted that in the above ease the trial
court granted the defendant's motion for dismissal on the
ground that the plaintiff was himself guilty of negligence
proximately contributing to the cause of his own injury;
however, the Supreme Court of Utah reversed the action
of the trial court, stating that the question of contributory negligence should have been submitted to the jury.
The above case is quoted with approval in DeW eesP
v. J. C. Penney Co., 297 P. 2d 898, 5 Utah 2d 116, Supreme
Court of Utah, May 25, 1956. At page 902, the upper
right-hand column, the Court makes the following
comments:
"As was stated in Stickles v. Union Pacific R.
Company, 'the question of contributory negligence
is for the jury whenever the evidence is such that
jorors, acting fairly and reasonably, may say that
they are not convinced by a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence
which proximately contributed to cause his own
injury.' The action of the trial judge was consistent with policy which has invariably been approved by this court of submitting disputed issues
as to negligence and contributory negligence to the
jury unless the matter is so clear as to be free
from doubt and reasonable minds would not differ
thereon.''
In accordance with the general rule, the De Weese
case states that in ruling upon the propriety of a directed
verdict, the court of appeal must consider the evidence
contained in the record ''in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.'' See page 902, the upper left-hand column.
9
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In brief, then, the Court in considering the plaintiff's
appeal must draw all inferences from the evidence most
favorable to the plaintiff and then determine whether or
not jurors, acting fairly and reasonably, might say that
they are not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence
that the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence. If
jurors could say they were not so convinced, then the
plaintiff should prevail in this appeal.
Before the factual circumstances of the case are
reviewed for the Court's consideration, it is deemed helpful to note how courts in the past have applied the above
test. Only one case need be cited: Wilkerson v. McCarthy
et al, 69 S. Ct .413, 336 U. S. 53, 93 L. Ed. 497, U. S. Supreme Court, January 31, 1949. This case was a personal
injury action rising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. (While it is true that this case is a negligenceon-the-part-of-the-defendant case, yet it will be recalled
from the opinion of StickleY. [Inion Pacific R. Company,
that the quantum of proof necessary to take the question
of contributory negligence from the jury is the same as
that in respect to primary negligenee. It is to be observed
further that general rules of negligence apply in F.E.L.A.
cases, for under the applicable statute ( 45 USCA 51) the
term "negligence'' is gi,·en no enlargement or variation
over its common hnY meaning. See in this regard:
Tlwmpsm1 Y. A. T. d': 8. F. Ry Co. (Cal.) 217 P. 2d
45; 96 CA2 974; Esca.ndou v. Pan American Forei.rtn CorJJ., 88 F. ~d :2/fi. CCA Tex. 1937; and the
eomments and easPs t... ited in )J ote 29 of 45
USCL\ ;)1.)

10
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In brief, the facts of the case were that the place of
the accident was a wheel "Drop Pit" situated in the
defendant's raihvay yard at Denver, Colorado. The pit
was completely enclosed on three sides thereof by chains
and on the fourth side by the side of a railway car. The
floor of the ear was a vertieal distance above the ground
of 44 inches. The horizontal distance between the car and
the nearest corner chain post was between 5 and 7 inches.
A "permanent board" traversed the pit within the chain
and car enclosure. The top surface of this board was
greasy and oily and had not been cleaned for several
months. In order to advance to the other side of the pit 7
the plaintiff went around a chain post nearest the car and
underneath the car in order to walk across the permanent
board from which he fell. An extensive recital of measurements is given in the Utah Supreme Court opinion, 187
P. 2d 188 at 189, in order "to assist the reader in forming a picture of the space through which plaintiff squeezed
in order to get onto the board from which he fell.'' The
trial court ruled that there was no negligence on the part
of the defendants as a matter of law and directed a verdict of ''no cause of action.'' The Supreme Court of U tab,
at 187 P. 2d 188, affirmed the action of the trial court, with
Mr. Justice Wade dissenting. The Supreme Court of
the United States reversed the decision of the Supreme
Court of Utah, stating that the issue of negligence should
have gone before the jury in the trial court. Thus, the
defendants were not free of negligence as a matter of
law even though their pit was completely enclosed on
three sides and almost completely enclosed on the fourth
side.
11
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rrhe facts of the above U. S. Supreme Court case are
much stronger than the facts of the present case.
Considering briefly the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is found that:
Plaintiff was driven by her husband to the residence
of the defendants on the evening of October 15, 1956.
Whn they arrived it was nighttime. The plaintiff and
her husband drove up the defendant's driveway, stopping
a few feet in front of the partition that separates the two
garage doorways of the defendants' double garage. The
garage door nearest the living quarters of defendants,
i. e. the door to the east, was open. A car was parked in
the east half of the garage next to the living quarters.
Only the rear, i. e. den, of the home was lighted. Earlier
in the day the defendant Ruth Wood said, "If there are
no lights in the front of the house, we will be in the back
room (den)."
The plaintiff's husband turned off the automobile
lights, the plaintiff proceeded out the right door of the
car and the plaintiff's husband out the left. At this point
of time (and before) the plaintiff saw emanating from
the right-hand side of the garage

ra~~s

of light of low

intensity, which she surmised and which in fact came from
the "den" or rear part of the residence. However, the
garage itself was almost totally dark. The rest of the
house was also dark as it was also outside the house,
sinee it "~as nighttime.

12
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There is to consider the plaintiff's knowledge and
situation immediately prior to her entrance into the defendants' garage and fall into their stairwell. The plaintiff had visited the premises twice before, once when the
home was under construction (when the stairwell did not
exist) and once when she and her husband had visited
the premises in 1955 (probably in December) some ten
months prior to the accident. At the time of the December
visit, plaintiff did not enter through the garage entrance,
but rather through the front door, was shown the interior
of the house and then was conducted from the den,
through the den door, and to the left down the stairwell
in the garage. This tour was made by flashlight and a
fair inference follows that the lights installed in the garage were off. In fact, there is no evidence that at that
time or any other time prior to her accident she acquired
knowledge that the garage in fact had lights.
Defendant Ruth testified that during her motherin-law's previous visit she had explained to her that the
defendants had planned on putting up an iron railing or
wall to separate the garage from the stairwell. Defendants, however, failed to inform the plaintiff that, in fact,
the proposed protective railing had never been installed.
The plaintiff's "knowledge" relating to the details
of the stairwell construction is meager at best.
Most important, it is to be noted that immediately
after the accident, when Theo Wood asked the Plaintiff
if she didn't remember the stairwell the plaintiff an-

13
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swered ''Yes,'' but because she had been so upset over
the wedding which was pending she had temporarily
forgotten about the stairwell. (See the Record at page
78, lines 26 through 29.) The wedding referred to concerned the plaintiff's granddaughter, who was to be
married on the 26th day of October, some eleven days
after the accident. Hence, what is found is that, immediately prior to the accident, the knowledge which the
plaintiff possessed of the stairwell and its location in the
garage was exceedingly dim, having been acquired
through a single visit which occurred some ten months
previous (December, 1955), and which was temporarily
blanketed by her present anxiety, concern, and preoccupation with the pending marriage of her granddaughter.
All that can be extracted from the testimony at R. 36,
lines 3 through 5, R. 37, lines 1 through 5, and R. 78,
lines 26 through 29, is that, under inferences of fact drawn
most favorably to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was possessed of a feeble, residual "knowledge" (psychological
conditioning) of the stair·well and its presence somewhere
in the garage by virtue of sensory experience of traveling
down the stairwell with the aid of the dim beam of a flashlight some ten months previously. ~-\..nd e\en this subconscious conditioning of the plaintiff was swept aside by
the plaintiff's oYcrwhelming mental preoccupation of her
granddaughter's pending marriage.
We an' now at a point to consider the rules relating
to contributory negligence. According to the Restatement of Torts, Section 466, contributory negligence may
be either of two types:

14
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(a) An intentional and unreasonable exposure of
the plaintiff to danger created by the defendants' negligence of which danger the plaintiff knows or has reason
to know, or
(b) Conduct which, in respects other than those
stated in dause (a), falls short of the standard to which
the reasonable man should conform in order to protect
himself from harm.
With reference to the clause (a) type of negligence,
(1) ''the plaintiff must know (accurately) of the physical
conditions created by the defendants' negligence and must
have knowledge of such facts that, as a reasonable man,
he should realize the danger involved.'' Furthermore,
(2) "the plaintiff must intentionally expose himself to
this danger; he must have the purpose to place himself
within reach of it. It is not enough that his failure to
exercise reasonable attention to his surroundings prevents him from observing the danger, or that lack of reasonable preparation or confidence prevents him from
avoiding it when the condition created by the defendant is
known to him.'' Last of all, (3) ''his intentional exposure
of himself to the known danger must be unreasonable.''
(See Restatement of Torts, Section 466 Comment c.)
In view of the above criteria, plaintiff cannot, as a
matter of law, be held to be guilty of contributory negligence of the clause (a) type. For example, the facts show
that the plaintiff did not have a knowledge that the stairwell did not have a railing; in fact, she was assured by

15
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her son's wife ten months previous to the accident that
a railing in fact would be installed to enclose the stairwell.
Opposing counsel has argued that the plaintiff could
have noticed whether or not a railing was installed around
the stairwell since light, though of feeble intensity, emanating from the edges of the closed door of the den would
have revealed the true condition of the stairwell to the
plaintiff. The observation made by opposing counsel is
believed to be inaccurate. Light emanating from the door
edges of the den toward the plaintiff would, quite probably, not reveal that a barrier did or did not exist around
the stairwell. If in fact a barrier in the form of a railing had been installed around the stairwell, it would have
been disposed inbetween the light and the plaintiff, and
below line-of-sight. Afortiori, light shining upon one side
of a railing does not reflect from its opposite side. If
below line-of-sight, there would be no discontinuity in
the light rays. Further, there is no evidence that thereflectivity of the garage floor would be sufficient to render
the dark void of the stairwell discernible. Additionally,
the stairwell void itself could not possibly reflect light in
the direction of the plaintiff.
Thus, the criteria (1) and (2) of the clause (a) type
of negligence are not satisfied.
The remaining question then is whether or not plaintiff's accident constituted contributon- negligence of the
clause (b) type.
The ultimate issue thus reduces itself to this :

16
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Did the plaintiff's conduct in respects other than that
stated in clause (a) fall short of the standard to which
a reasonable woman should conform in order to protect
herself from harm'~
It is observed from the record that the plaintiff approached the den through the driveway and did not
choose either to take the darkened walk around the rear
of the garage to the den or to enter the residence through
the front door. It is to be remembered that this is a case
of a mother visiting the residence of her own son. It is
not unreasonable for an intimate relative to forego the
alternatives of knocking on the front door of a darkened
front room or of walking down a darkened path leading
around the garage to the back yard and to the rear of the
den in favor of walking directly toward the light in the
room her family indicated they would be. A reasonable
inference would be that the plaintiff knew that a door
leading into the den existed in the east wall of the garage,
since she had made her exit from that very door once
before, and since she on this night in fact saw light coming from it.

Was she neglectful of her own welfare in failing to
search in the darkened garage for a light switch~ It is
urged that she was not neglectful in this regard in that
there was no evidence to show that she knew a light
switch ever existed in the garage; further, it is noted
that during her previous visit to the residence the tour
thereof was hy flashlight, presumably with the garage
lights left off. One is surely not negligent for his own
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welfare in failing to search for a light switch in an unfamiliar darkened garage which might not even have a
light switch.
Let us now consider the knowledge of the plaintiff
of the stairwell. Such knowledge, acquired through and
experience of ten months' vintage, would at best be hazy
immediately prior to the accident, if indeed such knowledge existed at all. It is to be remembered that she had
visited the area but once before and at that time had been
conducted down the stairwell from the den. Now at the
time of the previous visit, it would be a fair inference to
presume that no automobile was present in the garage.
Therefore, the plaintiff could have no knowledge whatever as to the distance between the stairwell and a car
parked in a usual position in the garage. Beside this fact,
however, there was evidence to show that she did not
know how far out into the garage the stairwell extended.
Thus, the plaintiff's knowledge of the dangerous stairwell
could reasonably be found to ha\e been meager at best.
Most important, it is to be obser\ed that immediately
prior to the time of the accident the plaintiff had forgotten about the presence of the stairwell, owing to the
pending wedding which was the plaintiff's immediate
concern.
The case of Deacy v. 11lcDonnell (Conn.), 38 A 2d
181, 131 Conn. 101, is here cited on the issue of whether
or not, from past experiencP, the plaintiff had acquired
a sufficient mental impression of the dangerous condition
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so as to be chargeable with actual knowledge of the dangerous condition, sufficient to defeat her recovery on the
ground of contributory negligence; or, to put it perhaps
more accurately, the issue in question is whether or not
the mental impression of the plaintiff concerning the
stairwell was so strong, by virtue of her past experience,
that she ought to be charged with the obligation of remembering the dangerous condition, and that failure to remember would constitute contributory negligence.
In the Deacy case the Court held that the fact that
the plaintiff had visited the defendants' premises on four
previous occasions and had seen the step down from
the front doorway to the porch and passed over it on
entering the night in question did not charge her with
negligence in not remembering the step down and taking
special precautions to avoid a fall on leaving in the darkness. A significant portion of the decision reads as
follows:
''The defendant's claim, ho·wever, that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
They base this on the fact of her previous visits to
the premises, and the further findings that on
the night in question, in going to her sister's room
she (plaintiff) had followed the same course as
she did when she was leaving; that she knew that
the stairway and entrance were unlighted ; and
that she asked for no light and did not use a match
or flashlight hut proceeded to grope her way in the
dark. That on previous visits she had seen the
step at the doorway and had passed over it when
she entered the building on the night in question
would not in itself convict her of negligence in not
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membering it and taking special precautions to
avoid a fall because of it.''
The rule of the Deacy case relating to contributory
negligence represents the overwhelming weight of authority on the subject. See for example:
Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Compa;ny
(Cal.), 282 P. 2d 69,44 C 2d 225, at page 76.

"Defendant's main contention is that the (jury)
instruction is not a correct statement of the law in
that momentary forgetfulness cannot indicate lack
of contributory negligence unless plaintiff is acting after being confronted with a sudden and disturbing situation (which was not present, but
which is present in the instant case) which causes
the forgetfulness ... The rule with respect to the
bearing of forgetfulness on contributory negligence has been stated in many cases. As expressed
in many cases and recent ones, whether forgetfuiness of a keen danger constitutes contributory
negligence is a question for the trier of fact, giving
consideration to the circumstances even though
there is no sudden disturbance or peril confronting the plaintiff and causing the lapse of memory; to forget is not negligence unless it shows a
want of of ordinary care. Generally the question
is one for the jury.'' (approximately 20 cases and
articles cited)
" ... As is said in Jacobsen'· Oakland ~feat Company, 119 P. 653, one element in all these cases
is the plaintiff's familiarifN with the danger he
forgot. To arbitrarily adopt as a standard of negligence per se the rule that if one may be charged
with a knowledg-e, past or present, of a danger, he
is precluded from recovery for injuries sustained
therefrom and let the rule rest there for all cases
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would be to establish a doctrine dangerous in its
application and unsound in principle and one not
warranted by the present weight of authority ....
The true rule to be deducted £rom the cases cited
is that the forgetfulness shown must be under circumstances sufficient to enable a court to determine that such lack of memory constituted negligence per se. . . . (emphasis supplied)

Johnson v. Pulidy (Conn.), 165 A. 355, 116 Conn. 443.
(In this case the Plaintiff had previously ascended
the steps of a restaurant, had eaten her dinner, and advanced toward the head of the stairs to pay her bill, a
place where the counter was located. There was approximately thirty ( 30) inches of space between the counter
and the head of the stairs. She happened to step back,
inadvertently, and fell down the stairs, thereby sustaining
injuries. The verdict was directed for the Defendant on
the ground of the Plaintiff's contributory negligence.
The case was appealed and reversed in favor of the Plaintiff. The Court stated:)
''Even though the Plaintiff had an opportunity
upon entering the restaurant to see the situation
created by the arrangements of the fixtures in
relation to the stairway, they (the Jury) could
also ha\'e reasonably found that she failed to realize the danger, or was momentarily inattentive
thereto. Under such circumstances, it would not
necessarily follow that she was guilty of contributory negligence. Where there is an extraordinary
risk, mere knowledge that there is some risk or
danger is not sufficient; there must be a comprehension of it before contributory negligence can be
found .... Where the plaintiff's act was instinctive
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or due to a momentary and excusable inattention,
it may not constitute contributory negligence.''
(The case also cites 45 Cor. Jur 947 et. seq., and
cases thereunder.)

Osier v. Customer's Company (Idaho), 248 P. 438
at 439, 42 Ida. 789.
''A person, although having previous knowledge
of the dangerous situation, but not having presently in mind the existence of the defect, is not
guilty of contributory negligence.''
Now, most imprtant, during her previous visit to the
residence the defendant Ruth Wood advised the plaintiff
that a railing was going to be installed around the stairwell so as to protect individuals from inadvertent falls in
the same. Would not such an assurance yet further dim
the memory of a dangerous condition which had not been
noticed but once before and, at that, noticed under the
dim beam of a flashlight? Further, could not the plaintiff reasonably rely upon the representation of her son's
wife that a suitable railing would be constructed and that
the danger at this late date would not be present'
It is respectfully believed that jurors would be entirely reasonable in sa~Ting that ~Irs. \Yoods was not negligent in failing to look for a light switch in an unfamiliar
darkened garage, which, to her knowledge, might not eYen
exist; further, a jury might be entirely reasonable to find
that the plaintiff could rPly upon the defendants' representation, made some ten months preYious to the accident, that they (the defendants) would install a protective railing about the dangerous stairwell.
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Aside from any knowledge which the plaintiff might
have had, was she contributorily negligent per se in entering a darkened garage"? Now the risk encountered by
one entering a darkened garage is that there might be
objects either on the floor or elsewhere with which the
traveler would come in contact or stumble over. The
plaintiff, however, fell into a pit; hence the result was
not within the risk created. Further, a jury might find
that the risk was not unreasonable under the circumstances.
In view of the above, it is respectfully submitted
that gross error was made in the court's ruling that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Opposing counsel insists upon the relevance
of Tempest v. Richardson, 299 P. 2d 124, 5 Utah 2d 174,
Supreme Court of Utah, July 7, 1956, to the present case.
It is to be observed that in the court below the Tempest
case was decided on a motion for summary judgment based
upon the pleadings and the plaintiff's deposition. It is to be
noted in the present case, that a motion for summary
judgment was made by the defendants, based upon the
pleadings and the plaintiff's deposition, but that such
motion was denied. There does not appear substantial
difference, to the plaintiff's detriment, in the trial transcript from the plaintiff's deposition and pleadings.
In the Tempest case, the plaintiff was directed by
the host to the bathroom which she was informed would
be lighted. Instead of going to the correct room, the plaintiff wandered through the house some distance to an un-
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familiar· door, opened it, and stepped "into a dark and
unlighted· area with which she was unacquainted" and
which in fact constituted an inside stairway leading to
the basement of the home. In the present case, however,
the defendants knew that the plaintiff would visit them
that evening, they informed the plaintiff that a light
would be on in the den of the home where the family
would be, the plaintiff saw that light emanating from
the den and, rather than use alternate routes to the home
which were unlighted and in fact dark, chose to follow
the light which she saw. The garage door nearest the den
in being open constituted and implied an invitation to
the plaintiff to enter. These facts clearly distinguish the
Tempest case.
Furthermore, the Court states in the Tempest case
that "It is general knowledge that a great many homes
have rooms on different levels which are reached by
stairways.'' In the instant case the Plaintiff could not
possibly be charged with such a type of ''general knowledge'' since it is not common knowledge that some build
unguarded stairwells in garages.
It is respectfully believed that such "knowledge"
that the plaintiff had at the time of her entrance into the
garage, which knowledge was obtained hy a single trip
down the stairwell, and taken some ten months previous
to the accident by means of a flashlight was insufficient
to charge the plaintiff with knowledge of the stairwell sufficient to defeat her respectfully in the instant action. Particularly would it seem to be so where, as the testimony at
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the trial indicates, the plaintiff had temporarily forgotten of the stairwell's existence immediately prior to
her entrance into the garage, owing to the urgency of said
wedding plans. Furthermore, it would appear that the
promise made to the plaintiff some ten months previous
to her accident that the stairwell would be provided with
a safety railing would further serve to smother what dim
realization of the stairwell's existence and condition the
plaintiff ever had.
Accordingly, plaintiff by her counsel respectfully
requests that she be given a new trial and that the issue
of contributory negligence be left, properly, in the province of the jury.
Respectfully submitted,
ELLIOT W. EVANS
M. RALPH SHAFFER
for EVANS & NESLEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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